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Abstract: The philosophy of AI has seen some changes, in 
particular: 1) AI moves away from cognitive science, and 2) 
the long term risks of AI now appear to be a worthy con-
cern. In this context, the classical central concerns – such as 
the relation of cognition and computation, embodiment, in-
telligence & rationality, and information – will regain ur-
gency.  
1.1. Getting interesting again? 
We set the framework for this conference broadly by these questions: 
“What are the necessary conditions for artificial intelligence (if any); 
what are sufficient ones? What do these questions relate to the condi-
tions for intelligence in humans and other natural agents? What are the 
ethical and societal problems that artificial intelligence raises, or will 
raise?” – thus far, this was fairly similar to the themes for the 2011 con-
ference (Müller 2012, 2013). 
This introduction is also a meditation on a remark by one of our 
keynote speakers, Daniel Dennett, who wrote on Twitter: “In Oxford 
for the AI conference. I plan to catch up on the latest developments. It’s 
getting interesting again.” (@danieldennett 19.09.2013, 11:05pm). If 
Dennett thinks “it’s getting interesting” that is good news, and it is sig-
nificant that he remarks that this interest appears again. 
In the following year, the AAAI invited me to speak about “What’s 
Hot in the Philosophy of AI?” (their title) – so the organization of AI 
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researchers around the world also thinks it might be worthwhile to have 
a look at philosophy again. And indeed, one of the major topics in the 
AAAI plenary discussion was the social impact of AI; the president of 
AAAI has now made ethics an ‘official’ topic of concern (Ditterich and 
Horowitz 2015). 
So, there are indications that ‘philosophy of artificial intelligence’ 
might have an impact, again. I think there are two major changes that 
make this the case: The changing relation to cognitive science and the 
increasing urgency of ethical concerns. 
1.2. AI & CogSci – a difficult marriage  
The traditional view of AI and Cognitive Science has been that they are 
two sides of the same coin, two efforts that require each other or even 
the same effort with two different methods. The typical view in the area 
of ‘good old fashioned AI’ (GOFAI, as Haugeland called it) until the 
1980ies was that the empirical discipline of cognitive science finds how 
natural cognitive systems (particularly humans) work, while the engi-
neering discipline of AI tests the hypotheses of cognitive science and 
uses them for progress in its production of artificial cognitive systems. 
This marriage was thus made on the basis of a philosophical analysis of 
joint assumptions – so philosophy served as the ‘best man’. 
This collaboration was made possible, or we at least facilitated, by 
the by classical ‘machine functionalism, going back to (Putnam 1960) 
and nicely characterized by Churchland: “What unites them [the cog-
nitive creatures] is that […] they are all computing the same, or some 
part of the same abstract <<sensory input, prior state>, <motor out-
put, subsequent state>> function.” (Churchland 2005: 333). If cognition 
is thus a computational process over symbolic representation (this thesis 
is often called ‘computationalism’) then computation can be discovered 
by cognitive science and then implemented by AI in an artificial com-
putational system. This was typically complemented by a view of cogni-
tion as central ‘control’ of an agent that follows a structure of sense-
model-plan-act; that rationally ‘selects’ an action, typically given some 
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utility function. – All these components have been the target of power-
ful criticism over the years. 
1.3. After GOFAI, “What’s Hot in the Philosophy of AI?” 
Two factors are different now from the way things looked only 10 or 20 
years ago: a) We now have much more impressive technology, and b) 
we have a different cognitive science. The result is, or so I will argue, 
that we get a new theory of AI and new ethics of AI. 
It currently looks like after the cold ‘AI winter’ in the 1980ies and 
90ies we are already through a spring and staring a nice and warm 
summer with AI entering the mainstream of computing and AI prod-
ucts – even if much of this success does not carry the name of ‘artificial 
intelligence’ any more. This is a version of the well-known ‘AI curse’: in 
the formulation known as ‘Larry Tesler’s Theorem’ (ca. 1970): “Intelli-
gence is whatever machines haven’t done yet.” What is successful in AI 
takes a different name (e.g. ‘machine learning’), and what is left for the 
old name are the currently impossible problems and the long–term vi-
sions.  
A lot of classical AI problems are now solved and even thought triv-
ial (e.g. real-life character recognition); robotics is now moving beyond 
the classic DDD problems (dirty, dangerous, dull). It appears that this is 
largely due to massively improved computing resources (processing 
speed and the ability to handle large data sets), the continued ‘grind’ 
forward towards better algorithms and a certain focus on feasible nar-
rower problems. It does not seem to be due to massive new deep in-
sight. 
What does this mean for our marriage? Is there a divorce in the of-
fing? The cognitive science side has largely learned to live with in sepa-
ration – not quite a divorce but a more independent life. There is no 
more the assumption that cognition must be algorithmic (computation-
al) symbol processing but rather a preference for broadly computational 
models. A strong emphasis on empirical work supports a tendency of 
cognitive science to undergo a metamorphosis from a multidisciplinary 
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enterprise to another word for cognitive psychology. Cognitive science 
now involves embodied theories, dynamic theories, etc. – and it tends to 
find its own path now, not as adjunct to AI. 
1.4. Ethics (big and small) 
It has always been clear that AI, esp. higher level AI, will have an ‘im-
pact on society’ (e.g. surveillance, jobs, weapons & war, care, …) and 
that some of that impact is undesirable, perhaps requiring policy inter-
ference. There is also the impact on the self-image of humans that 
makes AI, and especially robotics, have such a powerful impression on 
people who care a lot less about other new technologies. This is what I 
would call ‘small ethics’, the kind of ethics that concerns impact on a 
relatively small scale. 
There is also ‘big ethics’ of AI that asks about a very large impact 
on society, and on the human kind. A discussion of this issue is relative-
ly new in academic circles. Stuart Russell, one of our keynote speakers, 
had called it the question “what if we succeed?” (at IJCAI 2013) - 
(Bostrom 2014; Russell et al. 2015). 
If the results of the paper by Bostrom and myself in this volume are 
to be believed, then experts estimate the probability of achieving ‘high 
level machine intelligence’ to go over 50% by 2040-2050, over 90% by 
2075. Broadly, this will happen soon enough to think about it now, es-
pecially since 30% of the same experts think, that the outcome of 
achieving such machine intelligence will be  ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ for hu-
manity. 
I expect that this theme will create much discussion and interest, 
and that its speculation about what can be and what will be forces a 
return to the ‘classical’ themes of the philosophy of AI, including the 
relation of AI and cognitive science. 
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